

Message Text

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TO ALL AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 299336

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TAGS: PFOR, AO, US

SUBJECT: ANGOLA IN US PRESS

1. FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS FROM WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE
DEC. 17 BY MARILYN BERGER, UNDER HEADLINE "SENATE UNIT
VOTES ANGOLA AID CURB":

A SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE VOTED UNANIMOUSLY YESTERDAY TO PRO-
HIBIT AMERICAN ASSISTANCE TO ANY GROUP IN ANGOLA WITHOUT
SPECIFIC CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION.

IF THE MOVE GAINS CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL, IT WOULD EFFEC-
TIVELY END THE COVERT OPERATION UNDER WHICH THE UNITED
STATES IS NOW SENDING MONEY AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO TWO
GROUPS IN ANGOLA THAT ARE FIGHTING A SOVIET-BACKED FACTION.

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, MEANWHILE, TOLD CONGRESS
YESTERDAY THAT IT PLANS TO SPEND AN ADDITIONAL DOLLARS
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SEVEN MILLION IN ANGOLA BUT THAT IT WOULD THEN BE OUT OF
FUNDS FOR COVERT OPERATIONS ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD, RELIABLE
SOURCES SAID.

IN TESTIMONY BEHIND CLOSED DOORS TO THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE

ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND ECONOMIC POLICY, THE ADMINISTRATION EXPLAINED THAT TO CONTINUE ITS ANGOLAN OPERATION IT WOULD HAVE TO USE 28 MILLION DOLLARS IN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT MONEY...

THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE VOTED YESTERDAY AFTER HEARING TESTIMONY THAT CIA DIRECTOR WILLIAM E. COLBY HAD OPPOSED THE COVERT OPERATION IN ANGOLA.

ACCORDING TO RELIABLE SOURCES, THE CIA DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, WILLIAM NELSON, TOLD THE SENATORS THAT COLBY BELIEVED SUCH A LARGE OPERATION COULD NOT BE KEPT SECRET AND FURTHERMORE THAT HE DID NOT THINK IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE A DECISIVE EFFECT IN THE KIND OF WAR THAT WAS UNDER WAY.

THUS SENATORS WERE LEFT WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT IT WAS SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER WHO HAD INSISTED ON THE OPERATION.

TESTIMONY ALSO DISCLOSED THAT THE CIA HAS BEEN EXCHANGING INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA. AFRICAN SPECIALISTS HAVE WARNED REPEATEDLY THAT ANY CONTACT WITH SOUTH AFRICA WOULD BE A "KISS OF DEATH."...

DEP. ASST. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS EDWARD W. MULCAHY URGED THE COMMITTEE NOT TO CUT OFF FUNDS FOR ANGOLA, SAYING THAT TO DO SO WOULD ENCOURAGE THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, WHICH IS MEETING SHORTLY, TO ENDORSE THE SOVIET-BACKED POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA.

MULCAHY ALSO SAID THAT DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS WERE BEING MADE TO GET THE SOVIET UNION TO END ITS INTERVENTION. HE SAID UNCLASSIFIED

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THE UNITED STATES HAD SENT TWO NOTES TO MOSCOW. BUT IT HAD RECEIVED ONLY ONE ANSWER, AND THAT ONE WAS NOT "SERIOUS."

UNDER THE MEASURE APPROVED BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE YESTERDAY, THE PRESIDENT COULD REQUEST MILITARY ASSISTANCE UNDER THE REGULAR MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM BY SUBMITTING A PUBLIC REPORT EXPLAINING WHY SUCH AID IS IN THE FOREIGN;

POLICY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES. THE MEASURE IS NOT EXPECTED TO COME BEFORE THE FULL SENATE UNTIL AFTER THE CHRISTMAS RECESS.

HE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO GIVE DETAILS OF THE AMOUNTS AND

TYPES OF ASSISTANCE ALREADY FURNISHED. IF NEITHER HOUSE OF CONGRESS DISAPPROVE WITHIN 30 DAYS THE ASSISTANCE COULD BE PROVIDED.

SEVERAL PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETING OF THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE SAID THEY WERE ALSO INFORMED THAT THERE ARE FIVE TO EIGHT AMERICANS IN ANGOLA.

THESE WERE UNDERSTOOD TO BE CIA OFFICIALS WHO HAVE REPORTING FUNCTIONS ONLY. NO AMERICAN MILITARY ARE IN ANGOLA, THE SENATORS WERE TOLD.

COMMITTEE MEMBERS WERE TOLD THAT THE COVERT OPERATION IN WHICH ARMS AND MONEY HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO TWO FACTIONS KNOWN AS THE FNLA AND UNITA HAS COST DOLS. 25 MILLION SO FAR, SOURCES SAID. AN ADDITIONAL DOLS. 7 MILLION HAS BEEN earmarked FROM FUNDS AVAILABLE TO THE CIA AND THE ADMINISTRATION PLAN CALLS FOR AN ADDITIONAL DOLS. 28 MILLION. THAT WOULD PUT THE TOTAL AT DOLS. 60 MILLION, OR DOLS. 10 MILLION MORE THAN PREVIOUSLY REPORTED....

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE DEC. 17 BY LESLIE GELB UNDER HEADLINE "FORD IS OPPOSED TO COMBAT ROLE IN ANGOLAN WAR:"

PRESIDENT FORD HAS RULED OUT ANY FORM OF COMBAT INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA, INCLUDING THE SENDING OF ADVISERS, ACCORD-
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ING TO HIGH AND AUTHORITATIVE ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS, AND WILL NOT GO BEYOND THE CURRENT PROGRAM OF AIDING TWO FACTIONS FIGHTING A GROUP SUPPORTED BY THE SOVIET UNION.

THE OFFICIALS SAID THEY WERE WILLING TO MAKE THIS DISCLOSURE ALTHOUGH ANONYMOUSLY BECAUSE THE PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL FEAR THAT "ANOTHER VIETNAM" MIGHT BE DEVELOPING IN ANGOLA WENT FAR BEYOND WHAT THE ADMINISTRATION SEES AS THE LIMITED INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION IN THE OUTCOME OF THE CIVIL WAR IN THE FORMER PORTUGUESE COLONY.

ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIALS, THE UNITED STATES BEGAN AID IN ARMS AND CASH IN RESPONSE TO THE ENTREATIES OF TWO KEY AFRICAN LEADERS PRESIDENT MOBUTU SESE SEKO OF ZAIRE AND PRESIDENT KENNETH D. KAUNDA OF ZAMBIA. THE OFFICIALS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ANGOLAN SITUATION WAS NOW IN

DANGER OF GROWING INTO A TEST CASE OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN WILL IN AFRICA.

EVEN AS A TEST OF WILL, THE OFFICIALS INSISTED, MR. FORD AND SECRETARY KISSINGER BELIEVE THAT AMERICAN INTERESTS ARE

LIMITED, AND THE ANGOLAN SITUATION DOES NOT YET BRING THE WHOLE RELATIONSHIP WITH MOSCOW INTO QUESTION.

MR. KISSINGER HAS PUBLICLY WARNED THE SOVIET LEADERS THAT INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA "MUST INEVITABLY THREATEN OTHER RELATIONSHIPS." AND TODAY PRESIDENT FORD EXPRESSED SERIOUS CONCERN OVER SOVIET AND CUBAN ACTION IN PROVIDING EQUIPMENT AND MEN IN ANGOLA.

THE ONLY SPECIFIC AMERICAN INTEREST CITED BY THE OFFICIALS WAS THAT A MILITARY SETTLEMENT IMPOSED BY MOSCOW WOULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR SOUTH AFRICA. AS ONE OFFICIAL PUT IT, "ANOTHER RADICAL REGIME ON SOUTH AFRICA'S BORDERS WOULD BRING FIGHTING, AND BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS TO A BOIL."

SOME PENTAGON OFFICIALS DO NOT EVEN SEE ANY SIGNIFICANT STRATEGIC STAKES FOR THE UNITED STATES. ONE RANKING UNCLASSIFIED

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PENTAGON OFFICIAL SAID, "IT'S NOT A SOVIET-AMERICAN TEST OF WILLS, BUT A TEST CASE BETWEEN HENRY KISSINGER AND MOSCOW."

A VARIETY OF OFFICIALS SAID THEY THOUGHT SOVIET INTERESTS WERE ALSO LIMITED, BUT MOSCOW LIKE WASHINGTON, HAD BEEN CAUGHT UP IN THE PUBLIC EXPOSURE OF THE CONFLICT AND WAS TRYING TO FIND A FACE-SAVING WAY OUT.

BUT THESE OFFICIALS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT MOSCOW HAD NOT COMMUNICATED THIS VIEW AND CONTINUED TO AIRLIFT CUBAN SOLDIERS AND ARMS TO ANGOLA EVEN AFTER MR. KISSINGER BEGAN HIS PUBLIC WARNINGS FIVE WEEKS AGO.

IN SUM, WHILE HIGH ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS DENY THAT ANGOLA WILL TURN INTO ANOTHER VIETNAM, THEY ARE USING MUCH OF THE INDOCHINA RHETORIC OF THE EARLY 60'S -- WARNINGS TO OTHERS TO STAY OUT AND PROTESTATIONS OF LIMITED AMERICAN GOALS -- TO TRY TO PERSUADE MOSCOW THAT FURTHER INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA IS RISKY AND THAT COMPROMISE IS POSSIBLE.

THE OFFICIALS RECOGNIZE, THEY SAID, THAT THEIR JUSTIFICATION OF INVOLVEMENT IN TERMS OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RIVALRY AND THE IMPACT ON OTHER AFRICAN STATES SOUNDED LIKE FAMILIAR COLD WAR RATIONALES. THEY CITED NUMEROUS STATEMENTS BY MR. KISSINGER TO THE EFFECT THAT IF THE UNITED

STATES WERE NOT TO ACT IN SITUATIONS AS THESE, IT WOULD NO LONGER BE A GREAT POWER.

BUT THEY INSISTED THAT WHAT WAS NEW AND DIFFERENT WAS THE LIMITED AIMS AND MEANS OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT. THE OF-

FICIALS ASSERTED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT GO BEYOND A PROGRAM OF INDIRECT AID AND WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANY SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO THE ANGOLAN PARTIES THEMSELVES.

THE OFFICIALS SAY THAT THEY REALIZE THAT MR. KISSINGER'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND THE RECENT STATEMENTS OF DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, THE DELEGATE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, TEND TO INCREASE THE AMERICAN STAKE IN ANGOLA.

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THEY SAY THEY ARE COMPLETELY CONFIDENT, HOWEVER, THAT THE RHETORIC WILL NOT BE TRANSFORMED INTO DIRECT AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT, IF ONLY BECAUSE THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT CONGRESS WOULD NEVER AGREE TO IT.

ALL OF THE OFFICIALS INTERVIEWED SAID THEY WERE LESS CONFIDENT OF SOVIET RESTRAINT. SOME NOTED THAT MOSCOW HAS INSISTED ON ITS RIGHT TO SUPPORT "WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION" SINCE THE BEGINNING OF DETENTE AND MUST CONTINUE TO DO SO IN VIEW OF ITS IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION WITH CHINA.

OTHERS STRESSED THAT THE SOVIET LEADERS PROBABLY BELIEVED THAT THEIR AID TO ONE OF THE ANGOLAN FACTIONS, THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA, WAS A LOW-COST EFFORT FOR EASY GAIN.

"THEY PROBABLY SAID THAT HERE'S A GROUP WE'VE SUPPORTED FOR 15 YEARS, IT'S ALIGNED WITH US AND NOT THE CHINESE, IT'S ALREADY RECOGNIZED BY MANY AFRICAN STATES AND MORE WILL FOLLOW," THESE OFFICIALS SUGGESTED.

THE GENERAL VIEW SEEMS TO BE THAT THE RUSSIANS DID NOT COUNT ON AMERICAN COUNTER-AID AND DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY CALCULATE THE RISKS OF THEIR INTERVENTION TO DETENTE.

"WE HAVEN'T MADE A DECISION TO HOOK ANGOLA TO DETENTE NOR HAVE THE RUSSIANS," ONE HIGH OFFICIAL SAID. "SO FAR, WE'RE BOTH TRYING TO KEEP THE NUCLEAR ARMS TALKS, THE NEGOTIATIONS ON FORCE REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AND TRADE MATTERS, OUT OF THIS."

THE OFFICIALS SAID MR. KISSINGER'S PUBLIC WARNINGS TO THE RUSSIANS DID NOT REPRESENT A CHANGE IN POLICY.

"WHAT HENRY HAS BEEN SAYING," ONE OFFICIAL SAID, "IS THAT THE RUSSIANS SHOULD REALIZE THEY CAN'T DO THIS IN GENERAL, BUT CERTAINLY NOT IN AN ELECTION YEAR, AND IF THEY WANT TO GIVE US A BLACK EYE IN ANGOLA, IT WILL STRENGTHEN THE HANDS OF THE AMERICAN CRITICS OF DETENTE."

THERE IS NO PARTICULAR CONCERN IN THE PENTAGON OR IN MANY

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PARTS OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT SOVIET CONTROL OF ANGOLA WOULD PUT THE UNITED STATES AT A MILITARY OR ECONOMIC DISADVANTAGE.

PENTAGON OFFICIALS WOULD NOT LIKE TO SEE A SOVIET NAVAL BASE IN ANGOLA, BUT THEY DO NOT BELIEVE THAT SUCH A BASE WOULD GIVE MOSCOW CONTROL OF SHIPPING LANES FROM THE PERSIAN GULF, AS MR. MOYNIHAN CONTENDS.

STATE DEPARTMENT AND PENTAGON OFFICIALS WOULD NOT LIKE MOSCOW TO EXERT INFLUENCE OVER THE DISPOSITION OF THE OIL AND OTHER RESOURCES OF ANGOLA, BUT THEY POINT OUT THAT THE UNITED STATES IS NOT DEPENDENT ON RESOURCES FROM THAT AREA OF THE WORLD.

"OF COURSE, WE WANT ACCESS TO THE VAST WEALTH OF ANGOLA AND THE BORDERING AREAS," ONE STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL SAID, "BUT THAT IN ITSELF, OR WITH THE SOVIET BASE BUSINESS, IS NOT NEARLY ENOUGH TO JUSTIFY OUR INVOLVEMENT."

HISTORY OF INVOLVEMENT: OFFICIALS TRACED AMERICAN INTEREST IN ANGOLA BACK TO LAST SPRING. AT THAT TIME, THEY SAID, THE ADMINISTRATION DID NOT CARE WHAT HAPPENED AS ANGOLAN INDEPENDENCE APPROACHED. THE PREVAILING VIEW WAS THAT THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA IN THE NORTH AND THE NATIONAL UNION FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA IN THE SOUTH WERE TRIBALLY BASED AND WOULD BE ABLE TO HOLD THEIR OWN AGAINST THE GROUP THAT HAS SOVIET BACKING. THE ASSUMPTION WAS THAT THE WAR WOULD END IN A STALEMATE AND RESULT EITHER IN A COALITION GOVERNMENT OR IN DE FACTO PARTITION.

AT THAT POINT, THE OFFICIALS SAID, AMERICAN DIPLOMATS WERE APPROACHED BY PRESIDENT MOBUTU OF ZAIRE AND PRESIDENT KAUNDA OF ZAMBIA AND WERE ASKED WHETHER THE UNITED STATES WAS PREPARED TO DO ANYTHING TO PREVENT WHAT THEY JUDGED AS IMPENDING VICTORY BY THE POPULAR MOVEMENT IN ANGOLA.

MR. MOBUTU WAS SAID TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT A NEW INSURGENCY AGAINST HIM FROM ANGOLA AND WANTED A HAND IN THE DISPOSITION OF ANGOLAN RESOURCES. MR. KAUNDA WAS ALARMED BY UNCLASSIFIED

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THE PROSPECT OF UNFRIENDLY CONTROL OF THE RAILWAY LINKING HIS NATION TO THE SEA THROUGH ANGOLA.

THEN, AS NOW, THE OFFICIALS STATED, MR. MOBUTU WAS THE LINCHPIN OF AMERICAN POLICY IN AFRICA. ZAIRE IS RICH

IN RESOURCES AND CENTRALLY LOCATED, AND HE HAS BEEN READY TO HELP SMOOTH AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS.

THUS, THE OFFICIALS SAID, THE FIRST PHASE OF AMERICAN COVERT INVOLVEMENT WAS DESIGNED TO PLEASE THE LEADERS OF ZAIRE AND ZAMBIA. IN OCTOBER, THE SOVIET UNION FURTHER INCREASED AID AND BEGAN FLYING CUBANS; SOUTH AFRICANS JOINED THE FI

FIGHTING, AND MR. KISSINGER BEGAN ISSUING HIS PUBLIC WARNINGS TO MOSCOW.

THE OFFICIALS SAID THE AMERICAN OBJECTIVE REMAINED A STALEMATE, NOT VICTORY. THEY ARE WAITING FOR MOSCOW TO DEFINE ITS OBJECTIVE AS SOMETHING LESS THAN VICTORY.

3. FOLLOWING IS EXCERPT FROM NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE DEC. 17 BY DAVID BINDER, UNDER HEADLINE "FORD CONCERNED ABOUT SOVIET, CUBAN AID TO ANGOLA:"

PRESIDENT FORD EXPRESSED "SERIOUS CONCERN" TODAY OVER "ACTION TAKEN BY THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA IN PROVIDING LARGE QUANTITIES OF EQUIPMENT AND MEN TO ANGOLA."

A WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN, WILLIAM I. GREENER, SAID MR. FORD "FEELS A NEED FOR DISCUSSION IN THE CONGRESS OF THE GEO-POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THAT PART OF AFRICA TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE WEST."

MEANWHILE, THE SENATORS LISTENED TO ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS DEFEND A LIMITED AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA TO COUNTER SOVIET MOVES THERE.

"THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE C.I.A. HAVE BEEN URGING US NOT TO CUT OFF ECONOMIC OR MILITARY AID TO ANGOLA," SAID UNCLASSIFIED

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SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR., DEMOCRAT OF DELAWARE, AFTER EMERGING FROM MORE THAN THREE HOURS OF CLOSED-DOOR TESTIMONY BY WILLIAM NELSON, HEAD OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE, AND OTHER ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS. KISSINGER

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